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NOTES

A Draft Labor Code for Minsk: From

Byelorussia* With Love?
ABSTRACT
Belarus, a former Eastern bloc country located between
Russia and Poland, has drafted a comprehensive labor code
to govern employment relations. This Note presents the
historical underpinnings of the legislation, its major
provisions, and its prospects for successfully handling labor
disputes as well as encouraging foreign investment. The
authorfirst explores the current labor environment in Belarus,
especially focusing on the recent privatization of industry,
and its amenability to such regulation.
The Note then
analyzes specific provisions of the labor code and compares
them to the NationalLabor Relations Act in the United States,
as well as the conditions under which the NLRA was adopted,
and the Belgian Labor Inspection Act. Finally, the author
proposes improvements for this legislation, emphasizing in
particular the need for effective enforcement. The author
concludes that, while not perfect, the Draft Labor Code
represents a serious step toward labor reform in this
Republic.
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In March of 1992, potassium miners in Soligorsk, Belarus
renewed a year-old vow to strike in protest of a government
refusal to raise wage rates.' In addition to the work stoppage,
miners picketed warehouses, demanded new and more favorable
tariffs, sought a share of profits, and called for the transfer of
government-distributed
social insurance to the miners'

1.
Soligorsk Miners Resume Strike, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
Mar. 14, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, BBCSWB File.
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independent trade union. 2 At odds with the state, which ran the
mines through the Administration of Belarus Potassium Mines,
the strikers had little choice but to await the ruling of a state
judge reviewing legal action brought by the Administration
against the independent trade union committee that was
spearheading the strike effort. 3
The government agreed to
compromise with repeated pledges to raise wages in the mines,
but the strikers balked at the state's modest proposals. 4 With no
formal mechanism to mediate the dispute, the miners faced a
likely finding that the strike was unlawful and the inevitable
influx of strike-breakers resuming work at the mines.
Less than three years later, Belarus is on the verge of
adopting a comprehensive labor code that would address many of
the issues that moved the Soligorsk miners to strike. The new
Draft Labor Code (hereinafter the Code), was prepared by the
Belarussian Parliament with the help and guidance of the
American Bar Association's Central and East European Law
Initiative (CEELI).5 The Code covers a wide range of topics on
labor law in the new Republic, including extensive provisions on
wages and profit sharing. This Note will examine the Code in
light of the economic developments taking shape in the Republic
and the labor market as it stands today. The Note will analyze
specific sections of the Code and compare them to wellestablished statutes governing labor relations in the United States
and in selected European Community nations.
Part I begins by examining the present labor environment in
Belarus and will attempt to determine if it is conducive to

2.
Larisa Sayenko, Belarus: No Walesa Yet?, MOSCOW NEWS, Apr. 19,
1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Mosnws File. At the time, two trade
unions operated at the Belarussian potassium mines, one official and the other
independent. The latter union called the strike, which took effect on March 12,
1992.
3.
Id.
4.
Id. The independent trade union leaders conducted a political hunger
strike to protest what they termed the government's "anti-popular" policies.
Appealing to the world community and the trade union movement, the leaders'

efforts nonetheless proved largely fruitless. Id.
5.
The CEELI was started by the ABA in early 1991. Its purpose is to
foster democratic development in the emerging former Soviet Republics through
the technical aid and advice of legal professionals. U.S. lawyers, judges, and law
professors typically spend six months to a year in any of 18 Eastern and Central
European countries helping in the drafting of legislation, the reform of court
systems, and the development of law schools, to name but a few of their many
endeavors. CEELI has been participating in Belarus since 1992, focusing mainly
on bar association reform, constitution drafting, individual rights, press freedom,
and labor law. See generally Janet Key, Old Countries, New Rights, A.B.A. J., May
1994, at 68 (describing the creation and function of CEELI).
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adoption of the Code. This portion of the Note goes on to look at
the privatization of industry and its effect on the labor market as
a whole and, more specifically, the changing nature of labormanagement relations. This section will also examine the state of
labor organization vis-A-vis the history and current status of the
various trade unions throughout Belarus.
Part II will attempt to compare the present conditions in
Belarus politically, economically, and socially with the conditions

existing in the United States at the time of the adoption of the
National Labor Relations Act. 6 While markedly different political
systems created each country's respective labor code, both
countries suffered from harsh economic conditions at the time the
codes were proposed: in the United States, the Great Depression
was causing widespread unemployment and financial ruin, while
in pre-Code Belarus, the economy was still recovering from
decades of Soviet rationing. Before the Soviet breakup, the state
served as the employer as well as the lawmaker in Belarus; thus,
any labor legislation that may have been promulgated was almost
assuredly pro-employer. Likewise, the state-employer ran the
judicial system, which handed down pro-employer decisions with
great regularity.
Finally, Part III will propose ways in which the comprehensive
Code might be improved.
Following CEELI's analysis of the
Code, 7 this Note will compare aspects of the Code to labor
relations statutes in the United States and Belgium in order to
assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Code in terms
of employee rights and labor stability in general.

I. IS THE BELARUS LABOR STRUCTURE READY FOR THE CODE, AND VICE
VERSA?

A. The Trade Unions
Prior to the disintegration of the Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.) in
the late 1980s, the Republic of Byelorussia was a major industrial
center of the U.S.S.R.
Located between Russia and Poland,
northwest of the Ukraine, Belarus occupies an area of 80,154
square miles and has a population of over ten million

6.
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988). The NLRA was adopted in 1935.
7.
CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN LAW INITIATIVE, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
ANALYSIS OF THE DRAFT LABOR CODE FOR THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS (1994)
[hereinafter CEELI].
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inhabitants, 8 5.1 million of whom comprise the Belarussian
workforce. 9 Belarus is rich in natural resources,1 0 and industrial
activity accounts for roughly seventy percent of the gross national
product." The principle industries that still predominate in
Belarus are power engineering, metalworks, machine building,
12
petrochemicals, timber and woodworking, and construction.
The constitution of Soviet Byelorussia guaranteed citizens of
the Republic the right to work and, more importantly, the right to
unite into mass labor organizations or trade unions.1 3 Laborers
and office workers typically joined the trade unions on a voluntary
14
basis from region to region and industry to industry.
Participation in trade unions often led to active involvement in
Byelorussian factional politics at local, regional, and sometimes
national levels. i s At the local level, however, the trade unions
focused on workers' rights and actively attempted to safeguard
and promote the laborers' cause.
It has been said that the trade unions "play[ed] a leading role
in a system of socialist democracy, in all spheres of the life of
Soviet society." 16 The unions played an important part in the
industrial and social activities of workers at factories, offices, and
construction sites; in so doing, they "[drew] the [opinions of the]
masses of the people into the management of state and public
affairs," and played a significant role in the socioeconomic
development of industrial Byelorussia. i7 While it is clear that the
independent trade unions aimed to improve labor and social
conditions for workers, it is equally clear that, even up through

8.
JAN ZAPRUDNIK, BELARUS: AT A CROSSROADS IN HISTORY at xix (Alexander
J. Motyl ed., 1993). The Soviet census of 1989 showed a population of
10,128,000. Id.
9.
Id. at xx.
10.
Id. For example, potash salt, rock salt, peat, oil, lignite, coal, iron ores,
slates, bituminous shale, construction materials, mineral water, arable land, and
forests are all plentiful.
11.
Id.
12.
NOVOSTI PRESS AGENCY PUBLISHING HOUSE, BYELORUSSIAN SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLIC 37-44 (1972) [hereinafter NOVOSTI].
13.
Id. at 12.
14.
Id. at 13.
15.
MICHAEL C. URBAN, AN ALGEBRA OF SOVIET POWER: ELITE CIRCULATION IN
THEBELORUSSIAN REPUBLIC, 1966-1986, at 98-99 (1989).
16.
NOVOSTI, supranote 12, at 13.
17.
Id. The trade unions, it is noted, concerned themselves primarily with
the worldng people's desire for cultural facilities and everyday amenities. The
unions also sought to protect workers' health and ensure safe conditions in the
workplace.
Id. The trade unions, even in their earliest days, created
organizations and programs for the social and cultural benefit of Belarussian
workers. See NICHOLAS P. VAKAR, BELORUSSIA, THE MAKING OFA NATION 125 (1956).
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the Soligorsk strikes of 1992, the avenues through which they
could achieve such changes were extremely limited. Since the
state itself was the employer and owner-manager of industry in
socialist Byelorussia,1 8 labor protests, whether from the
Byelorussian Council of Trade Unions 19 or any other independent
trade union, would inevitably be answered by the very same entity
20
against whom the unions were protesting.
It was difficult enough for the trade unions to accomplish
labor reform as a united front. During the potassium mine
strikes of 1992, however, it became apparent that the workers
movement was no longer unified. 2 1 The two emerging wings of
the movement-the Belarus Free Trade Unions and the Labour
Confederation-adopted divergent views on strike and protest
strategies.
This division considerably weakened the labor
movement. 2 2 Political apathy rendered the influence of both
factions relatively anemic: less heed was taken of the official
23
trade unions than of the local, industry-specific union leaders.
Thus, in addition to the formidable odds of having to appeal to the
government as employer without a labor code or any real
mechanism of dispute resolution, the trade unions lacked popular
support as well.
In early 1994, a group of united free trade unions, comprised

of independent unions surviving from the days of Soviet rule,
again called for a strike by the nation's workers. This time the
broad-based coalition sought a general strike in protest of the
ouster of reformist leader Stanislav Shushevich. 2 4 Shushevich
had been replaced as speaker of the Supreme Council, and thus

18.
NOVOSrI, supra note 12, at 6.
19.
Id. at 13. This organization is the central and leading body of the
Belarussian trade unions, subdivided regionally into union councils and town
and district trade unions on an industry-to-industry basis. Id.
20.
This is not to imply that the state as employer would always flatly rule
against the unions. Yet, in a labor conflict where the union cannot appeal to a
neutral third party such as the state for resolution, because the employer and the
state are one and the same, the conflict will likely be resolved in favor of the
employer. This inference is inescapable since the state's interest in a socialist
regime will always be paramount. See, e.g., Soligorsk Miners Resume Strike, BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, Mar. 14, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library,
BBCSWB File (showing the results of the strike).
21.
Sayenko, supranote 2.
22.
Id. While the Belarus Free Trade Unions are more radical in nature
and tend to emulate Poland's Solidarity movement, the Labour Confederation
flatly rejects the general strike as a mdans of political struggle, limiting the strike
weapon to specific conflicts at individual workplaces.
Peaceful means of
resistance, such as sit-ins and nonarmed conflicts, have been advocated by the
Confederation. Id.
23.
Id.
24.
Kirill Koktysh, Political Protest Strike Planned in Belarus, UPI, Feb. 2,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
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head of state, 25 by an old-line conservative, Mechislav Grib-a
move that the trade unions felt did not bode well for economic

and labor reforms. The strikers called for widespread government
resignations and a new election in the hope that reformers would
introduce an independent, market-oriented economic policy and
spur privatization of industry.2 6 Unfortunately, there was. very
little public support for the work stoppage, and the reformers
conceded defeat after only one day.2 7
The trade unions
acknowledged that the strike was a failure in that it did not gain
support or participation at a national level. Yet, trade union
leaders claimed that the failure resulted because many state finns
had closed for "temporary holidays" in an effort to undermine the
28
strike.
Hampered by a lack of popular support, division among the
ranks, the pervasive dilemma of the state's role as employer, and
the absence of a labor code to govern disputes, the trade unions
had little remedy for labor disputes and little hope for
improvement.
Another factor working against the labor
movement in Belarus was and still is the judicial system.
Although the court system in Belarus is presently undergoing
many changes with the aid of CEELI representatives, 2 9 the
existing system is based entirely on Soviet justice 30 and is
severely limited in sophistication and scope of review.
State
political officials closely monitor and often directly control the

25.

ZAPRUDNIK, supra note 8, at xix. Belarus declared its independence

from the U.S.S.R. on August 25, 1991, over a year after declaring its state
sovereignty within the Soviet Union.
The government of the Republic is
democratic and parliamentary in nature, with the unicameral Supreme Council
(formerly the Supreme Soviet) appointing the prime minister and confirming all
ministers. As noted, the speaker of the Supreme Council acts as head of state.
Id. at xix, xx.
26.
Belarus: Labor Disputes, Reuter Textline, Lloyd's List, Feb. 16, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Txtnws File.
27.
Belarus: Labor Disputes, Reuter Textline, Lloyd's List, Feb. 17, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Txtnws File.
28.
Id. The trade unions implied that many state firms scheduled the
"temporary holidays" in advance of the stoppage in order to preclude as many
workers as possible from participating in the strike. Id. Again, it is not surprising
that when the state is the employer, it will do what it can to frustrate the labor
movement, which has nowhere to turn for support or regulation.
29.
Key, supranote 5, at 70.
30.
NOVOSTI, supranote 12, at 10. An elected judge as well as two elected
"people's assessors" examine cases. Although theoretically independent, these
judges may be summarily recalled by their electors-the Supreme Council of the
Republic, not the people-at any time before the end of their term. Id. at 11.
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judges who hear cases.3 1 Hence, trade unions' claims against the
state-employer are heard before state-employed judges who, one
can safely assume, will rule with the state's best interests at
32
heart.
B. The Effect of Privatizationon Economic Development andLabor
Reform
1. The Need for Labor Reform
Shifting focus from the trade union movement to the
individual worker, the need for a comprehensive labor code
becomes even more apparent. As economic reforms take shape in
Belarus, wages and salaries must be adjusted accordingly to
correspond to the shift to a market economy and its
accompanying price changes.33 Prior to the Soviet breakup,
Byelorussia featured minimal wage and salary increases by the
state and correspondingly minimal benefits packages afforded to
employees. 3 4
There was some semblance of workers'
compensation and an effort to secure pensions for all laborers. 35
These benefits were relatively small, however, and subject to the
whim of the government that provided them, since no labor code
36
protected distribution or receipt of such benefits.
Even with the privatization of state-owned properties and
businesses, there remains a manifest need for regulation of the
bargaining process and terms and conditions of employment in
31.
Id. See also Key, supra note 5, at 71 (noting remnants of "Soviet
'telephone justice,' in which local party officials routinely phoned the stateemployed judges to tell them how to decide cases").
32.
The Novosti volume outlines the strict surveillance to which Soviet
judges are subjected and notes the "strictly centralized" nature of judicial
oversight in Soviet states. NOVOSTI, supranote 12, at 11. Until extensive judicial
reform is realized in Belarus, the lack of an independent judiciary, coupled with
the lack of a formal labor code to govern disputes, will continue to have a
deleterious effect on trade union claims.
33.
Belarus Reforming Economy to Overcome Difficulties, Xinhua General
Overseas News Service, Aug. 17, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws
File [hereinafter Xinhua]. Acting Prime Minister Mikhail Mianikovich announced
the goals of introducing a market economy to the country by privatizing stateowned properties and breaking monopolies in Belarus to foster competition. Id.
34.
See NOVOSH, supra note 12, at 62-64. The slanted discussion of
"Growth of Incomes" here belies the stark poverty in which most Byelorussian
laborers lived-only 252 roubles annually per head of household for medical
costs, pension grants, and all other "benefits" bestowed by the state-employer. Id.
35.
Id. at 63, 64.
36.
See DAVID A. DYKER, THE PROCESS OF INVESTMENT IN THE SOVIET UNION
(1983). Moreover, the trade unions had relatively little power to monitor or
influence government investment policies.
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Belarus. While privatization will no doubt alleviate the state-asemployer burden, which the labor movement has borne for so
long, accompanying modernization and mechanization may well
lead to higher unemployment. 3 7 On the other hand, with the
growth of private industry and the influx of new technologies,
production may in fact increase and lead to the creation of new
job opportunities.3 8 In either case, labor unions will continue to
seek protection of workers' interests against the actions of both
public and private employers.3 9
While Belarus' burgeoning
market economy is in its turbulent nascent stages, a basic body
of labor law would further stablization. 40
2. Government Action and Worker Response
In response to privatization needs and the inception of a
market-based economy, the reformist Belarussian government in
1992 vowed to introduce price mechanisms suited to a market
economy; to improve banking, budget, and taxation; and to
institute land and housing reforms. 4 '
The Belarussian
Parliament has since adopted various statutes and regulations
concerning private enterprise, business ownership, leasing,
investment, and employment; moreover, it has established

diplomatic relations with fifty-eight countries in an attempt to
broaden its trading base. 42 Concomitant with this expansion of
privately-owned businesses, however, has been a troubling fall in
production and a corresponding rise in unemployment
throughout Belarus. 4A
While the absolute figures for
unemployment in 1992,4 4 and even today, 4 5 are extremely low,
the hidden forces of unemployment loom large:
"many

37.
See Belarussian Developments, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
Feb. 16, 1979, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File (showing how
automation and mechanization resulted in job loss in Belarussian industry as
early as 1979).
38.
See Xinhua, supranote 33.
39.
The Belarussian Federation of Trade Unions seeks higher minimum
wages, lower price increases, increased pension rates, scholarships, and other
benefits of employment.
40.
See generally ZAPRUDNIK, supra note 8.
41.
Xinhua, supra note 33.
42.
Id.
43.
'Covert Unemployment" as Unions Oppose Government Policy, BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, Sept. 12, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Arcmws File [hereinafter BBC Summary].
44.
Id. Ten thousand workers were unemployed, for a 0.5% rate. Id.
45.
The Unemployment Story, The Financial Times Ltd., East European
Markets, Sept. 30, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumvs File. The
unemployment rate in Belarus as of March 1994 was 1.7%. Id.
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collectives 46 work [only] three or four days a week. Thousands of
people are on leave without pay.
So there is covert
unemployment." 4 7 The Federation of Trade Unions cited the large
gap between price increases and the rise in incomes, as well as
low minimum wages, as the main factors causing the continued
48
unemployment.
In response, many unemployed Belarussian laborers have
migrated to the west and south in search of work in countries
such as Poland, Hungary, and Greece. 4 9 Hundreds of thousands
of Belarussian and Ukrainian workers have fled the dire economic
circumstances in their former Soviet states and taken jobs paying
up to $150 (U.S. equivalent) per month in Eastern European
countries where employment opportunities are more plentiful. 50
While these wages seem low, the relative wealth available
abroad 5 ' serves not only to provide thousands of Belarussians
with gainful employment manageably close to the homeland, but
also to combat the growing unemployment problem within the
Republic itself. As an added bonus to the economy, laborers
working temporarily in other countries have brought back to
Belarus more than one billion dollars to reinvigorate local

economies.

52

Short-term solutions such as working abroad, however, do
not adequately address the pressing need for labor reform within
the boundaries of Belarus. Indeed, by escaping to neighboring

countries that do have jobs available, Belarussian workers may
secure temporary employment, but the problems of low wages,
poor working conditions, and lack of benefits still exist in their

46.
Cooperative-collective farm workers are employed by ownership
groups, which are quasi-public entities that own the means of production and the
goods produced. NOVOSTI, supranote 12, at 6.
47.
BBC Summary, supranote 43 (quoting Vladimir Goncharik).
48.
Id.
49.
Over One Hundred Thousand Foreigners Work Illegally in Poland, PAP
Polish Press Agency, Dec. 26, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws
File.
Nearly 1.5 million Belarussians emigrated to Poland by the end of

September, 1994, several thousand of whom remained and worked without visas.
50.
Larisa Sayenko, Belarus, Ukraine Welcome Migration of Workers,
Reuters World Service, Aug. 19, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws
File.
51.
The average monthly wages for professionals-e.g., doctors and
engineers--currently amounts to about $25 in Belarus and $100 in Russia. Id.
Certainly the monthly income for migrant farm workers and potassium miners is
considerably lower.
52.
Id. According to Belarussian Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ling,

workers temporarily abroad have pumped in excess of one billion dollars back
into the suffering Belarus economy. Id.

1995]

DRAFT LABOR CODE FOR MINSK

new-found jobs.5 3 Thus, while they have succeeded in finding
work, at least for a while, the laborers still have not found better
work, which is the ultimate goal of the trade unions and
individual workers alike.- 4
3. Privatization Arrives
Along with adopting job creation and retraining policies,
Belarus must continue to promulgate specific legislation aimed at
encouraging and increasing privatization. Until very recently, the
Belarussians lagged behind Russia and the Baltic states in this
respect.5 5
Then in 1992, acting Belarussian Prime Minister
Mikhail Miasnikovich announced plans to privatize state-owned
properties and industries as part of a vigorous economic reform
program. 5 6 Nearly a year later, the Belarussian government
followed the Russian lead by issuing privatization vouchers to
individual citizens.5 7 The number of vouchers received by each
person depended upon, among other factors, the individual's
labor record. 58
While the implementation of this program
progressed slowly, it represented a clear effort to reward grossly
undercompensated
Belarussian labor by providing some
semblance of employment benefits.
Efforts at privatization have not gone without opposition,
however. For example, the recently formed Belarussian Research
and Production Party (BRPC) considered the privatization of land

and industries in Belarus to be "unwarranted" and pushed for
economic reform, but toward a more socially-oriented market
economy.5 9
Other ex-communist strongholds similarly voiced
opposition to the privatization-based economic reform underway
in Belarus. 60 Despite such resistance, however, the Supreme

53.
Id. Ukrainian officials, for example, have approached the German
government to ensure that migrant workers are being treated fairly. Germany
responded with a cold shoulder, noting that "they had their own problems. They
don't need Ukrainians." Id. (quoting the Labour Ministry official).
54.
BBC Summary, supranote 43.

55.
Id. at 101.
56.
Xinhua, supranote 33.
57.
Belarus to Issue Privatization Vouchers, Russian Information Agency
ITAR-TASS, July 10, 1993, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
58.
Id.
59.
IndustrialistsNow Have Their Own Party, Current Digest of the Soviet
Press, Nov. 11, 1992, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
60.
Id. It was noted that the ex-communists in Belarus had formed a new
party (BRPC) through which they could retain power and perhaps even win the
first democratic elections held early the next year. Id.
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Council, beginning in 1993, passed concrete legislation enabling
privatization.
Among the laws regulating privatization in Belarus at the
present time are: (1) the law "On Privatization of State Property
in the Republic of Belarus" (passed January 19, 1993), (2) the
law "On Registered Privatization Vouchers" (July 7, 1993), (3) the
"State Privatization Programme" (June 16, 1993), and (4) the
"Programme for the Privatization of State-Owned Property"
(August 20, 1993).61
The latter two statutes represent the
workhorses of the privatization process in Belarus. The "State
Privatization Programme" sets forth the strategy, objectives,
priorities, and procedures for privatization; the "Programme for
the Privatization of State-Owned
Property" outlines the
privatization procedures for state-owned enterprises as well as for
municipal
properties. 6 2
Governmental
regulations
and
supporting statutes 6 3 have supplemented these privatization laws
and have helped to overcome the initial resistance to
privatization."
Presently, the timber and wood processing
industries, as well as the service sector, are experiencing the most
dynamic privatization. 65 By the beginning of 1994, 191 state and
333 municipal enterprises had been privatized, 6 6 and government
projections for 1994 pointed to continued substantial increases in
67
both areas.
4. Privatization and Foreign Investment
Increased foreign investment in the nation's natural
resources has also resulted from the privatization effort in
Belarus. Under the socialist regime, foreign capital was rarely

61.
ORGANIZATION
FOR
ECONOMIC
COOPERATION
AND
DEVELOPMENT,
INVESTMENT GUIDE FOR BELARUS 102 (1994) [hereinafter OECD].
62.
Id.
63.
Id. For example, "On the Holding Companies Set Up in the Process of
Privatization" (Apr. 20, 1993, No. 250), "On the Procedures for Transforming
State-Owned and Leased Enterprises into Open Joint-Stock Companies" (Aug. 16,
1993, No. 552), "On Securities and Stock Exchanges" (Apr. 1992), and "On
Foreign Investment" (Nov. 1991), among other legislative acts, have all been
instrumental in guiding privatization in Belarus. Id.
64.
Id. The OECD notes that a temporary moratorium on all privatization
was effected by the Supreme Council in November 1992 as a result of growing
public concern about negative trends in privatization.
Id.
More recent
developments helped to overcome the early apprehension that pervaded the
Belarussian population. See generally ZAPRUDNIK, supranote 8, at 193-201.
65.
OECD, supranote 61, at 102.
66.
Id.
67.
BelarussianOfficial Criticizes PrivatizationLag, The British Broadcasting
Corp., BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Oct. 7, 1994, availablein LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File.
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invested in the Byelorussian market. The unique features of the
Soviet investment policy, 68 coupled with the pervasive general

restraint on the influx of foreign capital that characterized the
Cold War era, severely hampered Western investment. With the

fall of the Soviet Union, however, and the opening of Eastern bloc
markets, many Western companies have aggressively invested in
former Soviet economies. For example, German businesses are
becoming increasingly attracted to the developing Belarussian
Relatively low labor costs and growing
textile industry. 6 9
consumer purchasing power will draw more investment interest
in the future. 70 Another example, announced in May of 1992, is
the joint venture of Pepsi-Cola International and Eastman
Chemical Company along with two Republic of Belarus companies
to produce plastic beverage bottles in Belarus for the
Commonwealth of Independent States.7 1 Such endeavors have
and producing more income to
the dual effect of creating new jobs
72
bolster the Belarussian economy.
5. Effect of Privatization on Labor
The creation of new jobs represents not the end, however, but
rather the beginning of labor reform in Belarus. Along with
privatization and investment must come job creation policies and
training programs, which will enhance the modernization of the
Belarussian labor force. 7 3 Also, Belarus must continue to invest

See generally DYKER, supranote 36, at 1-17.
68.
Poland: No German Investments in the Polish Textile Industry for the
69.
Moment, Reuters Textline, Pzeczpospolita, Nov. 25, 1992, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Txtnws File.
Id.
70.
Historic Joint Venture Will Produce First Plastic Soft Drink Bottles in
71.
Belarus, Business Wire, Inc., May 28, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Arcnws File.

72.

Id. Pepsi-Cola International president Christopher A. Sinclair pointed

out that development of the plastic bottle production facility will generate new
sales opportunities in Eastern and Western Europe. Additionally, the Belarussian
partners who joined Pepsi and Eastman noted that the joint venture
is an important investment in new technology designed to serve the
consumers of Belarus, Russia, and the other Commonwealth states ....

It

is a concrete, creative matching of international technology and capital
investment with local manufacturing capability and resources. At the
same time, the... joint venture will be a significant generator of new hard
currencies ... since one half of the resin produced in Belarus will be sold
for hard currency in Eastern and Western Europe.
Id.
The Unemployment Story, supra note 45. While it is noted that the
73.
absence of job creation policies and the weakness of retraining efforts will result
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in domestic industries attractive to foreign interests by both
broadening the range of assets to be privatized 74 and simplifying
the methods of privatization.7 5 Privatization, both small- and
large-scale, 76 will channel more domestic and foreign capital into

both new and traditional industries, thereby increasing the
77

likelihood of a reinvigorated wage and employee benefits system.
Finally, privatization of Belarussian industry, especially on a
larger scale, may result in a significant shift of labor from the
traditional mining and agricultural jobs to higher-paying
industrial and manufacturing positions. 78 Once again, such a
shift will necessitate retraining programs.
Concern for the welfare of the labor force has grown, due, as
well, to the privatization of industry. Early on, the government of
the newly-formed Republic passed a series of legislative acts
dealing with social insurance and employment matters as part of
the economic reforms ushering capitalism into Belarus. 79 Worries
about labor-management relations and their effect on production
led to these legislative changes.8 0 More recently, the development
of employee benefits systems has come to the forefront. In
August of 1994, a delegation of workers' compensation specialists
visited Belarus to examine its health and retirement systems and
to explore a range of employee benefits policies. 8 Such concerns
no doubt provided part of the impetus for the promulgation of the
Draft Labor Code, which addresses health and retirement plans
as well as a host of other employee benefit programs.
Although privatization experienced a sluggish start in
83
Belarus, marked by public skepticism8 2 and political bickering,

in soaring unemployment "when privatization is moved into top gear," efforts at
formulating such policies and training programs have in fact been a major

accomplishment of the Belarussian Parliament since privatization began in late
1992. OECD, supranote 61.
74.
Id. at 103.
75.
Id. at 105.
76.
Id. Small-scale privatization is essentially the privatization of services
and small industrial and construction enterprises. Such privatization is usually
effectuated via auctions or tender sales. Large-scale privatization, on the other
hand, encompasses the privatization of large industrial enterprises and is
characterized by the transformation of such enterprises into open joint-stock
companies. Id.
77.
Specialists Visit Russia and Belarus, Reuter Textline, Insurance
Research Letter, Aug. 8,1994, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Txtnws File.
78.
See, e.g., OECD, supranote 61, at 26.
79.
Xinhua, supra note 33.
80.
Id.
81.
Specialists Visit Russia and Belarus, supra note 77. "The trip was
organized by the Citizens Ambassador Program of People to People International
at the invitation of the Insurance Department of Belarus." Id.
82.
ZAPRUDNIK, supra note 8,at 200. Nearly half of the collective and state
farm peasants indicated "total satisfaction with the present [socialist] system,"
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the process of privatization has thus begun to accelerate.
Problems being addressed include: the scarcity of housing in
urban Belarus, which restricts the mobility of labor;8 4 the

shortage of job creation and retraining programs; and the need for

employee benefits programs and improved labor-management
relations. With the possibility of a historic partnership between
the European Economic Union, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus on
the horizon,8 5 finally economic development seems to be in high
gear and employment opportunities on the rise in Belarus. It is
against this backdrop that the Draft Labor Code is pending
approval.

II.

THE PRE-WAGNER UNITED STATES AND CONTEMPORARY BELARUs:
SIMILARITIES, DIFFERENCES, THE ACT, AND THE CODE

A. Comparingthe pre-Wagner United States
and ContemporaryBelarus

It would be far too simplistic, though by no means
inaccurate, to merely say that labor problems existed in both the
United States and Belarus on the eve of the adoption of their
respective labor codes. This comparative analysis will focus on
two basic themes: (1) the emerging presence of labor as a key
factor in the national economy and (2) the inability of the

judiciary to adequately regulate labor-management relations. By
analyzing the countries in these two respects, striking similarities
as well as sharp differences will arise in the context of legislative

labor reform.

and many more workers simply stated that they saw no need to change: "[We]
have been brought up in the spirit of socialism." Id. at 193, 200. Also, many
Belarussians expressed legitimate fears of "cheating" by the various public and
private entities involved in the privatization process. Id. at 193.
83.
Id. By playing political games, local officials have hampered land
reform, and implementation of the privatization laws on the books has been
virtually nonexistent in some areas. See also the political tension on both sides of
the privatization debate, as documented in IndustrialistsNow Have Their Own
Party, CURRENT DIGEST OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS, Nov. 11, 1992, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
84.
OECD, supra note 61, at 27.
85.
Reuter EC Report Weekly Diary, Reuter European Community Report,
Jan. 20, 1995, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
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1. The Emerging Presence of Organized Labor as a Force in the
National Economy
By the time the National Labor Relations Act (the Wagner Act)
was adopted, organized labor had been a fixture in U.S. society for
quite some time. 8 6 Likewise in Belarus, the trade unions have
historically played a significant role in society, albeit on more of a
political than economic level. 87 Although the industrial revolution
occurred in the United States a century ago, the "industrial
revolution" in Belarus is just getting underway. 88 The recent
89
wave of privatization, which has created thousands of new jobs,
can be loosely analogized to the industrial revolution in the
United States, but the pre-existence of the trade unions in
Belarus weakens the analogy considerably.
The principal
difference between the pre-Wagner United States and pre-Code
Belarus is that, while organized labor in the United States, up to
the early 1930s, exerted a significant economic influence, 90 it was
in the political arena that organized1 labor in Belarus exercised
9
what little influence it could muster.
In Soviet Byelorussia, the socialist regime did not offer the
same opportunities for effective striking and other concerted
activities as did the emerging capitalist economy in the turn-ofthe-century United States. For example, as early as 1894, the
United States Strike Commission (hereinafter the Strike
Commission) was beginning to formulate U.S. labor policy. 92 By
contrast, in Belarus, as late as 1994, attempts at striking in the
name of union solidarity floundered pathetically, 93 and organized

labor was still not being taken seriously by either management or

THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 3 (Charles J. Morris et al. eds., 1971).
See, e.g., DYKER, supranote 36, at 48.
ZAPRUDNIK, supranote 8, at 192.
Id. at 193.
90.
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supranote 86, at 7.
91.
DYKER, supra note 36, at 48.
92.
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 86, at 13. President Grover
Cleveland appointed the Strike Commission to investigate disruptive union
activities, such as the infamous Pullman Strike in Chicago in which certain
officers of the renegade American Railway Union organized a boycott of the
Pullman Palace Car Company that evolved into a full-scale strike by hundreds of
railway employees. The result of the strike was massive delay in the running of
the Pullman sleeping car fleet, causing travel inconvenience and loss of revenue
to Pullman. The U.S. Supreme Court sustained an injunction against the
strikers, but the militant activity gave rise to dissident labor activity throughout
the United States. See generallyIn re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
93.
Belarus: Labour Disputes, supra note 27. See also Sayenko, supra
86.
87.
88.
89.

note 2 (outlining the relative impotence of the Soligorsk miners in their threeweek strike of the potassium pits).
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the government. 9 4 In the United States, the Strike Commission
concluded that employers needed to recognize and deal with labor
organizations; 95 in Belarus, trade unions continue to jockey for
position to gain the support of the working masses. 9 6 The Strike
Commission forcefully recommended federal mediation and
resolution of labor disputes; 9 7 the Belarussian trade unions
worked on social goals. 98 In short, the economic power of unions
in the United States was readily apparent, while the economic
power of trade unions in Belarus was, and still is, largely
nonexistent.
Nevertheless, the political presence of organized labor in
Belarus cannot be dismissed as entirely irrelevant in the context
of labor-management relations. While trade unions have not
spurred the adoption of extensive labor legislation there as in the
pre-Wagner United States, 99 their persistent activity has at least
made the democratic government aware of the need to directly
address the state of organized labor and the condition of the
working masses. 100 Still, until very recently, the trade unions did
not constitute a separate third party to be aided by legislative
action from the national government, as was the case in the
United States leading up to the adoption of the Wagner Act.
0
Rather, the trade unions were themselves political players.' '

Id.
94.
The Strike
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 86, at 13.
95.
Commission noted that if employers "take labor into consultation at proper times,
much of the severity of strikes can be tempered and their number reduced." Id.
(quoting U.S. STRIKE COMMN, REPORT ON THE CHICAGO STRIKE OF JUNE-JULY 1894
XLVII (1894)).
Sayenko, supra note 2.
96.
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 86, at 13. "In response to the
97.
railway strike that had occasioned its inquiry, the commission recommended a
permanent federal commission to investigate, conciliate, and if necessary decide
railway labor disputes, with judicial enforcement power." Id.
NOVOSTI, supra note 12, at 13. The trade unions "play an important
98.
social activities of the staffs of factories, construction sites, and
role in the ...
offices. [They] concern themselves with the satisfaction.., of the working people
for cultural facilities and everyday amenities, and with their health." Id.
For example, the Erdman Act, 30 Stat. 424 (1898), the Clayton Act, 38
99.
Stat. 730 (1914), the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. §§ 161-63
(1964), and the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15
(1964). These federal statutes expressly dealing with organized labor were all
enacted prior to the adoption of the NLRA in 1935.
Obviously, since the Code has been drafted in Belarus, the need for
100.
national regulation of organized labor has been recognized. The absence of any
pre-existing labor legislation, such as that cited supranote 99, begs the question,
"Why now?" Answering that question is well beyond the narrow confines of this
Note.
See, e.g., DYKER, supra note 36, at 48. The trade unions were largely
101.
subsidiaries of the Communist Party, and as such were often "sharply effective in
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Their political counterparts-first the Communist Party and later,
the State's various labor
under the new democracy,
administrations°2-served as their employers. Thus, unlike in
the United States where the federal government was required to

step in to resolve the economic problems created by the friction
between organized labor and management,1 0 3 in Belarus the
national government was not a disinterested third party but
rather management itself, all-powerful and unlikely to promulgate
any sort of pro-labor legislation. The dawn of privatization,
however, has left the government disinterested, so to speak, and
the growing capitalist economy has necessitated the present Code
to govern burgeoning labor-management relations.
The
Belarussian Parliament, as neither employer nor trade union
puppet, is now free to adopt the Code as the first step toward
labor relations reform in the new Republic.
2. The Inability of the Judiciary to Adequately Regulate LaborManagement Relations
While organized labor in the pre-Wagner United States and
the trade unions in Belarus differed in their economic influence

and activity, with respect to judicial regulation of labormanagement relations, several similarities can be noted. In
modern Belarus, as well as in the turn-of-the-century United

critici[z]ing and changing patterns which emerge[d] from the middle level of the
planning bureaucracy." Id.
102. See Sayenko, supra note 2.
103. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 86, at 25. The growing focus
on economic conditions and the need for legislative protection of labor interests in
the United States became manifestly evident:
The Great Depression and the advent of the New Deal spawned a political
climate that was favorable to-or at least tolerant of-the major federal
legislation thought necessary at the time to promote the growth of
organized labor. This growth was considered by many to be essential if
employees in [U.S.] industry were to acquire sufficient economic leverage
to bargain effectively with management. It was hoped that the end result
of these concurrent developments would be an equitable division between
labor and management of the spoils of private enterprise and,
coincidentally, an important impetus to the revitalization of the economy.
The economic conditions prevailing during the early 1930s focused
attention on the plight of... working [people], and economists were quick
to point out that low spending power among the employees of [U.S.]
business would prolong the Depression. The infallibility of industry
management was disproved by post-1929 events, and the political
influence that management could marshal against pro-union legislation
was considerably diminished by the abrupt change from a boom to a bust
economy.
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States, courts were loathe to aid striking unions, choosing instead
to halt such activities, order laborers to return to work, and
°4
While the
permit industry to continue without disruption.1
policies behind such court decisions differed in the respective
countries,1 0 5 the results were the same. Also, early on, neither
judicial system had adequate legislative guidance to rule upon
Finally, the remedies
matters of employment relations. l ° 6
available in court were limited in both contexts: in Belarus, the
courts would not aid labor; in the United States, the courts could
not aid management. 107
In response to the earliest strikes by organized labor in the
United States, the courts repeatedly employed the injunction as a
means of resolving the conflict, almost always in favor of
management.1 0 8 This tactic was rationalized as a way to promote

industrialization without the potentially injurious interference of
militant labor groups.1l 9 The courts essentially responded as
best they could in

the absence of any statutory guidance on the

matter. To "maintain order," it made sense to simply enjoin those
who disrupted the order from continuing to do so. This crude
approach was excusable, since at that point no legislation existed
"to formulate a rational basis for discriminating between tolerable

104. In the United States, the method of choice for courts was the
injunction, which ordered striking workers to cease their concerted activity and
return to work. Even temporary injunctions served management purposes well,
as crucial union momentum was lost and rarely regained. See THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW, supranote 86, at 7. In Belarus, reviewing judges simply found strikes
unlawful, and the state-employer readily dismissed the strikers who refused to
return to work and hired strikebreakers. See Sayenko, supranote 2.
In Belarus, the courts frowned upon strikers because they threatened
105.
the socialist regime. In the United States, on the other hand, courts disfavored
strike activity because it stymied the already staggering capitalist economy.
The legislative acts cited, supra note 99, did eventually provide some
106.
guidance to the reviewing courts in the United States. No such groundbreaking
labor law existed to assist Belarussian judges.
As noted above, the Belarussian courts run by the Belarus
107.
government, in essence the strikers' employer, simply had no motivation nor
desire to aid dissident laborers. The U.S. judicial system had no statutory
guidance or standards with which to formally quash strike activities. Thus, even
though the reigning public policy was to aid management and boost the
foundering national economy, the legislative tools available to the courts to carry
out this policy were severely limited.
108. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 86, at 7. "The injunction was
used in the labor field almost exclusively at the behest of employers to prevent
Rarely would a union
Id.
injury by restraining concerted labor activity."

successfully obtain injunctive or other equitable relief. Id. at 7 n. 19.
Id. at 7. "The law has intervened only where it was necessary to
109.
NAT'L LAW.
maintain order or to prevent injurious or fraudulent actions."
COMMITIEE OF THE AM. LIBERIY LEAGUE, REPORT ON THE CONSI1TIIONALITY OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 19 (1935).
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and intolerable concerted employee activity."1 1 0
Likewise in
Belarus, until the very recent past, courts invariably found strike
activity unlawful, since it was inherently at odds with the goals of
the state-employer,"1* and-by no means a coincidence-no
statutory guidance in this area existed.
Once legislative guidance did become available for the courts
112
in the pre-Wagner United States, enforcement of these acts
and judicial regulation of labor-management disputes still
suffered from a remedial problem. Often the only remedy a court
could offer beleaguered employers was judicial proclamation of
'the illegality of union activity if, in fact, it was not protected by
the new acts.1 1 3
Thus, ironically, once the courts obtained

statutory guidance in the area of labor relations law, they
suddenly became 'constrained by the very terms of the new
legislation; remedies were limited in the ex post setting of
adjudication, at which point economic and industrial damage had
already been done." 4 In Belarus, on the other hand, it was not
the case that the courts could not fashion adequate remedies for
either labor or management. Instead, the courts simply refused
to aid labor and consistently sided with management-the state,
their employer." 5 Remedies in the context of strike litigation
generally were limited to a declaration that the strike was
unlawful and an order to return to work" 6-a
scenario
remarkably similar to the early "injunction" days of U.S. labor
relations adjudication.
Thus, in both the pre-Wagner United States and in
contemporary Belarus, the inadequacy of judicial protection of
labor interests manifested itself almost immediately.
In the
United States, this situation led to the enactment of various

110. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supranote 86, at 7.
111.
See discussion suprapp. 862-66.
112. For example, in 1890 Congress promulgated the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7, which rendered illegal "every contract combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy ... in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several states." See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 86, at 9 (quoting 15
U.S.C. § 1). In 1914, Congress passed the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, which

courts interpreted narrowly in order to suppress concerted labor activity in the
1920s and early 1930s. See generally THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 86,
at 10-12.
113. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 86, at 8. The author observes
that "by the time a controversy reached the courts, industrial strife usually
already had occurred, and the remedies available limited the range of judicial
decision to the question whether the union activity in question should be
punished or suppressed, and if so, by what sanction." Id.

114.

Id.

115.

See supranotes 30-32.

116.

See, e.g., Sayenko, supranote 2.
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statutes governing organized labor" 7 and ultimately to the
adoption of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). In Belarus,
even after independence was declared and communism rejected,
national policy encouraged judicial subordination to employer
(state) interests." 8
Yet, with privatization on the rise and
organized labor as strong as ever, the prospective Draft Labor
Code may represent the first step toward equitable labor relations
law in Belarus.
B. The Code Arrives: Introduction and Overview Vis-d-Vis the
NationalLaborRelations Act
Before analyzing the Belarussian Draft Labor Code and
comparing it to the labor laws of other nations, it is necessary to

examine the motivating factors behind the drafting of the Code.
As the CEELI experts who assessed the Code noted, the proposed
Code "represents an enthusiastic attempt to regulate the totality
of employment relationships between workers and employers in
Belarus.1n 9
Rooted in the prior laws of the Byelorussian
Republic, 120 the Code features provisions designed to regulate
both the individual rights of workers and the collective rights to
organize trade unions and bargain with management. The Code
addresses additional concerns that include, but are not limited to,
the following: economic security for workers; protection of the
disabled, women, and children; the normalization of wages and
working conditions; the creation of labor dispute commissions;
and unemployment benefits. 12 1 Such a comprehensive approach
to labor reform will undoubtedly help Belarus to attract foreign
investment capital, 12 2 another factor that may have spurred its
drafting.
The Belarus Code, unlike its U.S. counterpart, the Wagner
Act, 123 contains no introductory statement of policies or findings.

117. See supra note 99.
118. See supra notes 30-32 for details of the persistent problems inherent
in the Belarussian court system even after the fall of the Communist regime.
119. CEELI, supra note 7, at 1.
120. Id.
121. Id.

122. Id. The experts note that the ambitious Code addresses labor
relations, vocational training, trade unions, employers associations, collective
bargaining, employment rules, public works programs, unemployment benefits,
social insurance, and the settlement of labor disputes, all of which affect foreign
investment. Legislative supervision of these matters may well encourage foreign

capital to invest in a country with a stable, well-regulated labor force.
123. Wagner Act, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 151 (1988)). The motivations behind enactment of the Wagner Act are
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The objectives of the Code are spelled out clearly, although briefly,
at the commencement of the prospective legislation as: (1) the
fixing and protection of mutual rights and obligations of workers
and employers and (2) the development of social partnerships
between employers (and their associations), workers (and their
associations), and public authorities. 12 4 The scope of the Code is
likewise very broad, in that it will apply to "all the workers and
employers pursuing their activity in the territory of the Republic
of Belarus." 125 From this introductory language it is clear that
the Belarussian lawmakers intended to broadly regulate all forms

of labor-management relationships in the new Republic. 126
In specific areas, the Code is indeed quite ambitious and
comprehensive.
The dissident miners of Soligorsk, 12 7 for
example, would be pleased by the protection and expansion of
social insurance for workers, 12 8 as well as by the extensive
provisions for the settlement of labor disputes. 129 This latter
portion of the Code establishes procedures for considering
individual labor disputes, 130
creates a
labor
disputes
commission,1 3 1 and provides for consideration of labor disputes in
courts of law. 132 Obviously, contemporaneous improvements in

found in Section 1 ofthe Act, entitled "Findings and Policies." The purpose of the
Act was and is to effectuate the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes
of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate
and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of their own choosing for the purpose of negotiating the terms and
conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection. 29 U.S.C. §
151 (1988).
124.
Draft Labor Code of the Republic of Belarus, ch. 1.2, art. 1.2.0-1
[hereinafter Code].
125. Id. ch. 1.3, art. 1.3.0-1.
126.
Id. Article 1.3.0-2, entitled "Relations governed by the Labour Code,"
states that the Code shall govern labor relations based on contracts of
employment as well as relations arising from the following: in-plant vocational
training of workers; trade union and employers association activities; collective
bargaining; personnel relations at the enterprise level; the provisions of
employment; the control and supervision of the observance of labor legislation;
public social insurance matters; and the settlement of labor disputes. This
section further notes that the Code provisions effectively preempt pre-existing
statutes and local acts governing cooperatives, enterprises, and partnerships of

collective forms of ownership, with regard to social insurance, pensions,
promotion
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

schemes, and other conditions of employment.
See generally Sayenko, supra note 2.
Code, supranote 124, ch. 5.1, art. 5.1.0-1.
Id. at ch. 2.18, art. 2.18.0-1 to art. 2.18.0-19.
Id. at ch.2.18, art. 2.18.0-2.
Id. at ch. 2.18, art. 2.18.0-3.
Id. at ch. 2.18, art. 2.18.0-9.
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the Belarussian court system are mandated, 13
but the
mechanisms created by the Code to deal with labor disputes
represent a step in the right direction. Also, the Code deals with
work-related health 13 and safety1 3 5 concerns in detail, perhaps
reflecting the influence of a group of workers' compensation
specialists who visited the Republic at the behest of the Insurance
Department of Belarus.1 3 6 Finally, the dearth of job creation and
retraining programs discussed above 3 7 is alleviated significantly
by several Code provisions.1 3 8 These areas are but a few of the
many aspects of the employment relationships governed by the
Draft Labor Code.
The extensive provisions for collective bargaining within the
Code13 9 preserve the right of employees to self-organize and form
labor organizations, much the same as the NLRA does in the
United States. The Code additionally provides for lawful employee

strikes, picketing, and other concerted activities, 140 which are all
part of a comprehensive effort to establish and monitor the
"democratic" rights of workers in the new Republic.1 4 1 With the
establishment of a formalized Code governing labor-management
relations, Belarus has created a further inducement (in addition
to favorable privatization laws) for foreign investment capital.
With a mechanism of collective bargaining already in place, the
Republic
provides
a
hospitable
climate
for
further
industrialization and investment without the extremes of labor
apathy or unrest. Indeed, foreign capital interests will inevitably
be attracted to the stable structure of the Belarussian labor
market engendered by the Code.
Having briefly considered many of the salient aspects of the
Code, it is appropriate at this point to examine in greater detail
specific provisions of this historic document and to compare them
with corresponding sections of the NLRA and the Belgian Labor

133.

See generaUyKey, supra note 5, at 69, 71.

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Code, supranote 124, at ch. 7.4, art. 7.4.0-1 to art 7.4.0-52.
Id. ch. 2.16, art. 2.16.0-1 to art. 2.16.0-20.
Specialists Visit Russiaand Belarus, supranote 77.
See supranote 43.
For example, chapter 2.14, Article 2.14.0-1, "Skill improvement and

retraining," requires employers to retrain employees at least once a year. Code,
supra note 124, at ch. 2.14, art. 2.14.0-1. Additionally, Chapter 4.7, Article
4.7.0-1, et seq., provides for vocational training, skill improvement, and retraining
of unemployed individuals. Id. at ch. 4.7, art. 4.7.0-1.
139. Id. at ch. 6.6, art. 6.6.0-1, et seq.
140. Id. at ch. 6.9, art. 6.9.0-1, et seq.
141.
See, e.g., CEELI, supra note 7, at 7. The experts note that the
provisions governing collective employee rights "are fundamental to a democratic
labor law and ...
essential to establish a balance of bargaining power between

employers and employees." Id.
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Inspection Act. 142 From these comparisons this Note will suggest
improvements to the Code focusing on the economic and political
factors discussed above.

III. IMPROVING THE CODE: COMPARISONS WITH THE NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS ACT AND THE BELGIAN LABOR INSPECTION ACT

A. The NLRA and the Belgian LaborInspection Act as Points of
Comparison
Given the similarities outlined above between the pre-NLRA
United States and pre-Code Belarus, in terms of the need for
legislative guidance on the subject of labor relations, the NLRA
provides a good basis for evaluating the legislative response in
Belarus. Before comparing the Belarussian Code to the NLRA, it

is necessary to briefly discuss the structure of the U.S. law. The
NLRA begins with a statement of findings and policies, 14 3 in
which the drafters outline the primary reasons for its adoption.
This section of the NLRA is followed by a comprehensive set of
definitions, 1'" which the Belarussian Draft Labor Code essentially
lacks.
The next four sections of the NLRA detail the creation of the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the Board) as the agency
of the federal government of the United States authorized to deal
with labor-management disputes. 145 Delegation of adjudicative
power under these sections creates a regional system of dispute
resolution in which regional directors hear cases in over thirty
offices set up throughout the United States. Such a system
allows uniform national labor legislation to govern at even the

142.
The NLRA has been in effect in the United States since 1935. And, the
Belgian Labor Inspection Act, which has been in effect for nearly 25 years now, is
viewed as a model of labor law enforcement by European Community peers and
commentators. See, e.g., id. at 14.
143.
See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
144.
See 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1988). While every term is concededly not
defined as narrowly and precisely as might be desired--"the term 'employee' shall
include any employee," Id. § 152(3). The detail and depth that permeate the
definitions section of the Act serve to guide reading of the Act and greatly simplify
interpretation.
145.
29 U.S.C. §§ 153-56 (1988).
A 1947 amendment to the NLRA,
fashioned as the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Sections 141-67,

171-97, increased the number of Board members from three to five and made
many other substantial additions to the original NLRA sections creating and
governing the NLRB. Each year the NLRB hears thousands of cases nationwide.
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most local levels. 14 6 The final section in the NLRB portion of the
Act provides: "The Board shall have authority from time to time
to make, amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed by the
Administrative Procedure Act, such rules and regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act." 14 7 Given
both adjudicatory 14 S and rulemaking powers by the NLRA, the
Board serves as the principal enforcer of national labor relations
law in the United States.

The Belgian Labor Inspection Act (hereinafter the Belgian
Act), on the other hand, offers an instructive perspective into
methods of enforcing labor legislation. Promulgated in 1972 and
amended as late as 1989, the Belgian Act features substantial
enforcement provisions that are lacking in the Belarussian Code.
Comparing the latter with this modem piece of European
legislation will help to magnify some of the Code's more glaring
deficiencies and also shed light on some key ways in which it can
be improved.
The Belgian Act states that officials under the control of the
ministers are vested "with responsibility for employment and
labour, social welfare, [and] health and economic affairs ..... 149
These "social inspectors," are charged with the enforcement of
Belgian legislation concerning the social protection of workers,
working conditions, labor regulations, industrial health and safety
standards, social security, and social assistance.' 5 0 The Belgian
Act provides detailed mechanisms for investigations and
penalties to
enforcement, and includes both civil and criminal
5'
inspectors.'
the
in
vested
power
the
reinforce

146. For example, wood cutters in rural Washington are protected by the
same rules and regulations governing representation in elections under the NLRA
as are computer software specialists in southern California, and the regional
directors in Seattle and Los Angeles respectively ensure such equal protection.
The regional directors must keep abreast of any and all changes in the rules and
regulations that emanate from the General Counsel's office in Washington, D.C.
They are also required to apply the governing labor law uniformly throughout the

United States. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1988).
147. 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1988).

148.

Adjudicative power is actually vested in the Board under Sections 9-11

of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 159-61. These sections outline the Board's duties in
overseeing elections (Section 159) and enjoining or remedying unfair labor
practices (Section 160). Section 161 delineates the investigatory powers of the

Board that are "necessary and proper for the exercise of the powers vested in it by
sections 159 and 160 of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 161.
149. Labour Inspection Act, No. 12 (1972), § 1 (Belg.) [hereinafter Belgian
Act].
150. Id.
151. Id.§§4, 16.
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As does the NLRA, the Belgian Act begins with a section of
definitions, laying the groundwork for the terms and phrases
included in the subsequent provisions.1 5 2
The next several
sections of the Belgian Act outline in great detail the investigatory
and remedial powers vested in the social inspectors. Unlike the
NLRB, which operates as an independent agency separate from
the federal and state courts of the United States, the social
inspectors in Belgium work in tandem with local magistrates and
judges in carrying out the nation's labor laws. 15 3
Upon
investigation and a finding of some violation, the inspectors have
the authority to levy administrative fines on guilty employers, 15
issue warnings, set time limits for improving conditions,1 5 5 and in
all cases, document the violations in official reports. 1 6 Thus the
Belgian Act includes effective enforcement mechanisms and
remedies to carry out the labor legislation in that country.
B. The Draft Labor Code: Specific Provisions
The foregoing discussion of the present economic conditions
in Belarus and the problems facing the labor market in the new
Republic point to six major areas that the Code must address: (1)
collective bargaining, (2) labor disputes, (3) strikes, (4) health and
safety in the workplace, (5) social insurance, and (6) job training
and retraining. The next section discusses these major areas of
concern, along with an introductory comment on the importance
of definitions, in the context of the proposed Labor Code.
1. Definitions
While both its U.S. and Belgian counterparts feature
comprehensive "definitions" sections, the Belarussian Code

152. Id. § 2. While there are not quite as many definitions in the Belgian
Act as in the NLRA, the usefulness of this section is readily apparent, and its
presence serves to further magnify the lack of such a section in the Belarussian
Code.
153. For example, § 1 explicitly provides: "Without prejudice to the duties

of the officers of the judicial police, social inspectors shall be responsible for the
enforcement of this Act and its implementing orders." Belgian Act § 1. Also, the
section that governs access to workplaces and initial investigations warns that
social inspectors "shall have access to inhabited premises only with the prior
permission of a police court magistrate." Id. § 4. Finally, in § 10: "The social
inspectors may request the assistance of the municipal and state police in the
performance of their duties." Id. § 10.
154.
Id. § 14. The Belgian Act provides for rather stiff fines in the event of a
violation-eight to 30 days in jail and a fine of up to 50,000 francs for each
violation and up to 200,000 francs in a given workplace. Id. §§ 16-17.
155.
Id. § 9(1).
156.
Id. § 9(2)-(3).
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contains a very limited glossary. Chapter One of the massive,
639-article Code provides definitions of only nine "basic terms"
used throughout the Code. 157 Roughly twenty-five pages long,15 8
the NLRA contains a glossary with thirteen definitions. 15 9 The
Belgian Act covers a mere eleven pages, yet provides ten
definitions. 160 By contrast, the Code comprises approximately
262 pages of text 16 1 and includes a myriad of complex articles on
specific topics, yet it provides only nine definitions. Logic would
dictate that the more comprehensive the Code, the more
comprehensive the definitions section ought to be. Failure to
clearly define key terms referred to repeatedly throughout Code
sections 16 2 may lead to confusion and hamper enforcement
efforts.
The CEELI commentators reviewing the Code note in
particular the problems that may arise from the dearth of defined
Presently
terms in the collective bargaining chapters. 163
undefined are terms such as "gross violation of worker's [sic] labor
"public employment
"reserved job," and
obligations," 16
service." 165 The CEELI experts recommend subsections that
would provide definitions of terms used in each chapter and topic
area, 16 6 thus eliminating any potential ambiguity. The failure to

define these and other terms in the Code may not only retard the
development of labor-management relations in Belarus, but may

157. Code, ch. 1.1, art. 1.1.0-1.
158. This page approximation is based on the reprint of the NLRA in
Appendix A of THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 86, at 895.
159. 29 U.S.C. § 152.
160. This page approximation is based on the reprint of the Belgian Labor
Inspection Act contained in Appendix B of CEELI, supranote 7.
161.
This page approximation is based on the reprint of the Code in
Appendix H of CEELI, supranote 7.
162. Id. at 3. The CEELI experts recommend an expansion of the limited
glossary of definitions in order to include frequently used terms that occur
throughout the body of the Code. Id. The commentators note the use, without
definition, of terms such as "consultations" and "participation" between union
representatives and employers: "The Code does not make clear what these
consultations or participation entail and whether or not there is a difference
between the two." Id. Other potentially confusing terms used at various points
throughout the Code include "penalties," "social partnership," "guilty acts," and
"harm to property," to name just a few.
163. Id. See also Code, supranote 124, chs. 6.6, 6.7.
164. Id. at ch. 2.4, art. 2.4.0-10, discussing additional reasons for
terminating an employment contract.
165. Id. at ch. 2.2, art. 2.2.0-1, which prohibits the withholding of an
employment contract in the case of certain citizens.
166.
CEELI, supra note 7, at 2.
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also lead to unnecessary and costly litigation to achieve definition
16 7
through the judiciary.

In short, numerous specialized terms are employed
throughout the Code, most of which are undefined. The glossary
of terms found in Article One of Chapter One of the Code contains
only the most basic vocabulary used in the Code. 168 This
glossary states that "[o]ther terms shall be defined in the relevant
chapters of this Code." 16 9 However well-intentioned the drafters

may have been, they failed to carry out this mandate. None of the
seventy-two chapters succeeding the glossary contains even one
explicit definition of any of the terms found therein, and gleaning
definitions from context is no easy task in the massive, dense
Code. Although ambitious and comprehensive in its coverage of
labor law, the Code suffers from potential ambiguities that could
be remedied by including more definitions either in the glossary
170
or at the beginnings of selected chapters.
2. Collective Bargaining
The Belarussian Code devotes a considerable amount of
space to the topic of collective bargaining. This is appropriate for
a nation still in the process of converting its economy to a
capitalist format, as "[t]he process of collective bargaining is the
standard method of organizing workers and employer groups
within the capitalist economic structure." 17 1 Since the collective
bargaining process is the backbone of the NLRA and not a central
focus of the Belgian Act, this Note will compare the Belarussian
Code with the NLRA in the substantive areas of collective
bargaining and employment agreements.
The NLRA guarantees all employees the "right to selforganization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of

167.

Id. at3.

168.

Article 1.1.0-1(1) defines "labour legislation," "legislative acts," "local

standard acts," "a contract of employment," "an employer," "a worker," "the
parties," "a trade union," and "an employer's authorized official." Code, supra
note 124, at ch. 1.1, art. 1.1.0-1(1).
169. Id. atch. 1.1, art. 1.1.0-1(2).
170. The CEELI commentators note that, "The present construction of the
Code may give rise to some ambiguities . . . because of the limited use of
adequately defined terms.' CEELI, supra note 7, at 2. The experts emphasize
that the "otherwise excellent draff would greatly benefit from the inclusion of
additional definitions for terms commonly found in the draft. Id. See also supra
note 162.
171.
Id. at7.
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collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ....
The Code provides:
"To engage in collective bargaining, the
parties shall, on equal terms, set up a commission made up of
authorized representatives.
Its composition and the time and
place of negotiations shall be determined by the parties." 173
Thus, under the Code, as under the NLRA, authorized
representatives negotiate on behalf of the Belarussian workers on
equal terms with the employers' representatives. Although the
Code does not spell out employees' rights as specifically as does
Section 7 of the NLRA, it implicitly assures fair representation
and fair bargaining for all employees working in Belarus. 17 4
One important difference, however, between the two nations'
labor codes is illustrated by Article 6.7.0-5 of the Belarussian
Code. The system of collective bargaining under the NLRA is
premised on "exclusive representation," under which one union or
representative selected by a majority of workers represents all the
workers of a given employer.' 7 s The Code, on the other hand,
explicitly authorizes multiple representation and thus ensures
that each worker may choose his or her own spokesperson. 1 7 6
The U.S. method of exclusive representation assures all
employees of representation in collective bargaining with the
employer; the Code's proposed method of multiple representation
will guarantee al employees their preferred representative in

collective bargaining with the employer. While the latter method
may initially seem more attractive to workers, such a system may

172.

29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).

173.

Code, supranote 124, ch. 6.6, art. 6.6.0-1.

174.
The many detailed sections of the Code dealing with representation,
bargaining, and the handling of grievances, discussed at length below, evince a
general policy of fair representation and fair bargaining for laborers in Belarus.
175.
See, e.g., Section 9 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159. See also CEELI,
supranote 7, at 8.
176. Article 6.7.0-5 of the Code discusses multiple representation and the
many potential parties to a collective bargaining agreement: "Union[s] or any
other authority representingworkers' interests and employer or its duly authorized
representative shall be the parties to a collective bargaining agreement." Code,
supra note 124, at ch. 6.7, art. 6.7.0-5(1) (emphasis added); "Where several
unions represent the interests of workers employed by the employer, a party to a
collective bargaining agreement may be ....
"
Id. at ch. 6.7, art. 6.7.0-5(2)
(emphasis added).
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result in a more complicated
bargaining process involving too
17 7
many interested parties.
The NLRA imposes upon both employer and employee
7 8 It
representatives an affrmative duty to bargain in good faith.1
further requires the parties to adhere to strict timing
requirements and to resort to mediation prior to a strike or
lockout should any dispute arise concerning the terms and
conditions of a new contract. 1' 9 These provisions discourage any
unnecessary strategic halting of the bargaining process. 180 The
Belarussian Code specifically provides that the parties to a
collective bargaining agreement "shall have no right to
discontinue negotiations unilaterally." 18 ' This provision appears
to impose a duty to bargain in good faith upon all representatives
in the bargaining process. Specific guidelines governing impasse,
82
such as those contained in Section 158(d) of the NLRA,1
however, are lacking in the Code, and Article 6.6.0-1 is
distressingly vague on the topic: "Other issues pertaining to the
conduct of negotiations shall be defined by the parties." 183 This
general, hands-off approach to the bargaining process is quite
ironic, given the exhausting detail of Chapter 6.7, which governs
18 4
collective bargaining agreements and employment contracts.
177. The proposed draft's inevitable result of multiple representation will
insure representation for employees who want it but will create a
cumbersome administration. The Code (sic) may wish to address rules
aimed at orderly bargaining when two or more unions or worker
representatives are involved. The provisions in Article 6.7.0-5 do not
adequately address this issue.
CEELI, supranote 7, at 8.
29 U.S.C. § 158(d). This section requires employer and employee
178.
representatives to "meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect
to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment .... " Id.
179. Id.
180.
CEELI, supranote 7, at 3. The CEELI experts note that "fb]oth parties
to the collective bargaining process . . . should be obligated to bargain in good
faith and be prohibited from halting the bargaining process and declaring an
impasse without utilizing all services available[,] including mediation and
arbitration." CEELI, supranote 7, at 8.
181.
Code, supra note 124, ch. 6.6, art. 6.6.0-1(4).
182. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
183.
Code, supra note 124, ch. 6.6, art. 6.6.0-1(7).
184. According to CEELI, the "highly detailed nature of the Code" is an
illustration of the tradition of centralized control that the Code unnecessarily
perpetuates: "the first 185 pages of [the Code] covers (sic) many of the working
conditions normally found in collective bargaining agreements negotiated between
independent unions and employers in other nations." CEELI, supranote 7, at 8.
The experts note that such comprehensivesness in the Code may initially
harm the labor market in Belarus. Recognizing that a less exhaustive regulation
of the collective bargaining process and agreements thereunder would help
develop a more responsive domestic economy, the commentators add that "[less
regulation] would allow small and medium sized enterprises greater freedom in
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Thus, although the proposed Code heavily regulates the content
of collective bargaining in Belarus, the method of bargaining itself

is not as tightly controlled; consequently, the duty to bargain in
good faith is much more hollow than it first appears.
3. Labor Disputes
Once again, since little in the Belgian Act touches upon labor
disputes, this discussion will compare such Code provisions to
those in the NLRA. The Belarussian Code is quite comprehensive
in its treatment of this topic. The Code contemplates a multi-level
system for resolution of labor disputes, providing for
consideration of individual disputes regarding collective
bargaining agreements, labor legislation, and other employment
agreements by labor dispute commissions or by the courts of
law. 1 8 5 In fact, in many respects the Code compares favorably
with its U.S. counterpart on the subject of labor dispute
resolution. One major difference, however, is the absence of a
national agency, such as the NLRB, to ensure uniform regulation
of labor disputes throughout Belarus.
The Code enables workers and employers to create labor
dispute commissions to settle specific disputes at specific
worksites.18 6 Article 2.18.0-3 provides that the labor dispute
commission be "made up of an equal number of trade union's and
employer's representatives whose term of office shall be one year."
The article goes on to define the authority of the representatives
on the commissions and to establish guidelines for the
Subsequent
organization and conduct of the commissions.
articles outline the procedures that the commissions should
87
follow in receiving claims and adjudicating labor disputes.'
Unlike the NLRB, which receives claims regarding alleged unfair
labor practices and applies the provisions of the NLRA to all
decisions, the dispute commissions under the Code will apply the
terms of individual collective bargaining agreements to each

hiring new employees[,] thus adding to the general growth of the economy." On

the other hand, the heavy regulation early on will protect the Belarussian labor
force until the newly established democratic unions gain prominence in the labor
system and garner enough strength to adequately protect member workers. Id. at

9.
185. Code, supra note 124, at ch. 2.18, art. 2.18.0-1(1). This article further
provides that, "Individual labor disputes of certain categories of workers shall be

considered in accordance with the specific regulations" of Chapter 3.16 (dealing
with higher-level government employees, for example judges). Id. at ch. 2.18, art.
2.18.0-1(2).

186.

Id. at ch. 2.18, art. 2.18.0-3(2).

187.

Id. at ch. 2.18, art. 2.18.0-(4-6).
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individual claim heard.ss While labor regulation throughout
Belarus will lack uniformity as a result, each individual dispute
will be settled according to the tailor-made guidelines of the
particular collective bargaining agreement under which it arises.

Since the labor dispute commission system in Belarus closely
resembles the arbitration system in the United States,1 8 9 it may
achieve similarly satisfactory dispute resolution at the local level.
The Code's failure to establish a national agency akin to the
NLRB, specifically ordained to deal with labor-management
disputes at the national level, however, leaves a glaring void in
the system.
Parties dissatisfied with a labor dispute commission decision
may appeal to a court of law within ten days of the commission's
decision, 190 and if no commission exists in a particular
workplace, claimants may institute actions directly in the
courts. 19 1
The NLRA, on the other hand, grants exclusive
jurisdiction over claims arising under it to the NLRB.192 Appeals
may be taken in any court of appeals in the United States, 193 but
all claims under the NLRA must be originally filed with the Board
(unless state law specifically provides otherwise).
The CEELI commentators would modify the Code to "provide
[a] central 'Labor Disputes Commission' with the authority to
enforce the substantive rights given employees and unions by the
Code provisions governing collective bargaining." 194 Such power
in a commission would liken it considerably to the NLRB 195 and
would normalize labor dispute resolution across all industries

188.
Id. at ch. 2.18, art. 2.18.0-4(2).
189. The Belarussian labor dispute commissions will consist of equal
numbers of employer and employee representatives. The arbitration process in
the United States typically features, one employer representative and one
employee representative (both attorneys) and a neutral arbitrator. Labor dispute

commissions will

agreements.

evaluate

disputes

arising

under

collective

bargaining

Arbitrators decide cases originating in grievances based on

competing interpretations of collective bargaining agreements. Thus, while labor
dispute commissions would adequately serve the role otherwise performed by
arbitrators, the Code does not provide for any sort of national agency or

association, such as the American Arbitration Association in the United States,
from which parties in dispute could choose a neutral arbitrator to further aid in
the dispute resolution process.
190. Code, supranote 124, at ch. 2.18, art. 2.18.0-7.
191.

Id. at ch. 2.18, art. 2.18.0-9.

192. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a).
193. Id. at § 160(e).
194. CEELI, supranote 7, at 8.
195. The commentators go on to suggest that the revamped Commission
"should be independent and be granted exclusive jurisdiction over questions of
representation,

appropriate

bargaining

units,

elections,

and

unfair

labor

practices." Id. The resemblance of the CEELI-envisioned Commission to the
NLRB is unmistakable.
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throughout Belarus. Having finally established a specialized body
of law to govern labor relations, the next logical step for Belarus is
to create a specialized government agency the sole function of

which would be the administration of that new body of law.
Finally, the Belarussian legislation and the NLRA appear
strikingly similar in their treatment of remedies.
The Code
96
and back pay' 9 7
specifically considers both reinstatement'
awards, as well as penalties for failure to honor a commission or
judicial decision.19 8 The NLRA likewise provides for reinstatement
and back pay, 199 in addition to standard cease and desist orders
and other declaratory and injunctive relief. The commissions
under the Code are permitted broad discretion in determining the
amount of monetary awards to grant prevailing parties in labor
disputes. 2° °
The NLRB has similar discretion to determine
whether or not to award back pay and what amount is
20
appropriate to effectuate the policies behind the NLRA. '
4. Strikes
Chapter 6.9 of the Code deals with the subject of worker
strikes in great detail. The Code outlines three specific events
that may trigger a lawful strike: (1) rejection of proposals made
by a conciliation committee, (2) rejection of a mediator's
proposals, or (3) nonconcurrence with an arbitration award
binding on both employer and employees. 2 ° 2 Strikes are valid if
adopted by at least a two-thirds majority of the workers at a given
worksite. 20 3 The NLRA, by contrast, merely contains a general
statement of employees' collective right to "engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or
protection." 2° 4 While it is universally accepted that this section
guarantees workers the right to strike when appropriate, the
NLRA contains none of the detail governing strike activity featured
in the proposed Code.
Through eighteen articles the Code
discusses various aspects of striking, limitations and prohibitions
thereon, and the effects of striking on both participating and
nonparticipating workers. Such detail will guide workers, inform

196.
197.

Code, supranote 124, atch. 2.18, art. 2.18.0-11.
Id. at ch. 2.18, art. 2.18.0-12.

198.

Id. at ch. 2.18, art. 2.18.0-14.

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

29 U.S.C. § 160(c).
Code, supranote 124, at ch. 2.18, art. 2.18.0-(17-18).
29 U.S.C. § 160(c).
Code, supra note 124, at ch. 6.9, art. 6.9.0-1(2).
Id. at ch. 6.9, art. 6.9.0-2(1).
29 U.S.C. § 157.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

892

[Vol. 28:859

unions of their rights, and give notice to employers of the
potentialities involved in lawful labor strikes.

Such

exhaustive

regulation

of strikes

may,

however,

ultimately hamper workers' ability to unite in concerted action
against a recalcitrant employer. The provisions of Article 6.9.01(2) appear to require the use of conciliation and mediation before

a resort to arbitration, 20 5 thus allowing employers more time to
subject disgruntled workers to unsatisfactory terms before the
dispute ripens into a strike situation. This protracted treatment
of collective bargaining disputes substantially diminishes the
apparent power the Code gives to workers. Furthermore, the
stringent attendance and voting requirements for calling a
20 7
strike20 5 weaken the rights guaranteed under the Code.
Finally, the strong penalties imposed upon workers and unions
engaged in unlawful strikes 2 8 may serve to further shunt
workers' rights, since the potential ex post determination of
unlawfulness by a court of law now looms as a serious risk, with
serious ramifications.
Despite
the
more
comprehensive
and
arguably
disadvantageous attention given the issue of strikes in the Code,
certain similarities with the NLRA on this topic undeniably benefit
both individual workers and employers. For example, just as
Section 7 of the NLRA protects the workers' right to refuse to
participate in strike activity, 209 Article 6.9.0-4 of the Code
prohibits the coercion of workers into striking or foregoing such

205.

See generally CEELI, supra note 7, at 9. The commentators note

specifically that "[p]erhaps one, but not both, of these procedures should be
required before the use of arbitrators. Most labor statutes in democratic nations
require that only one of these procedures be utilized as a form of alternative
dispute resolution" (citation omitted). The commentary goes on to warn that the
mandatory conciliation provisions may well be used by employers as a tactic to
delay the effective settlement of a dispute that they feel they probably will not win.
Id.
206. Code, supra note 124, at ch. 6.9, art. 6.9.0-2.
207.
See generally CEELI, supranote 7, at 9.
208.
The Code states that workers engaging in an unlawful strike "may be
subject to disciplinary or other liability pursuant to legislation." Code, supra note
124, at ch. 6.9, art. 6.9.0-16. Likewise, "[a] trade union staging an unlawful
strike shall be assessed a fine in the amount fixed by a court." Id. at ch. 6.9, art.
6.9.0-18. The Code also provides that anyone (worker or union) who, "by force or
by a threat of force, compel[s] workers to take part or to refuse to take part in a
strike, as well as persons preventing workers who do not wish to take part in a
strike from continuing their work[,] shall be criminally liable under legislation." Id.
at ch. 6.9, art. 6.9.0-17 (emphasis added)
209. 29 U.S.C. § 157. This section reserves employees' "right to refrain
from any or all of such [concerted] activities...." Id.
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action. 21 0 The Code further protects those workers who do not
wish to engage in strikes by prohibiting strikers from preventing
such nonstriking workers from continuing their work 21 1 and by
threatening serious punishment for those who do not comply with
this rule. 21 2 While no criminal penalties attach under the NLRA,
it does similarly prohibit lawful strikers from coercing nonstrikers
into joining the cause. 2 13 Commensurate with this statutory
obligation to refrain from coercion of nonstriking workers, the
Code requires strikers, during the course of a lawful strike, to
"ensure lawfulness, to keep public and other property intact and
to preserve public order." 2 14 Thus the Code does at least provide
adequate protection of the rights of those employees who choose
not to engage in strike activity.
Through detailed regulation of the strike-calling process and
with the caveat of severe sanctions in the event of an unlawful
strike, the Code does succeed in protecting, to some extent, the
right of workers to strike in Belarus. Coupled with the extensive
coverage of labor dispute settlement in the Code,2 15 these
provisions will ensure a more orderly and more equitable handling
of employee grievances in the future. The price that Belarussian
laborers, such as the Soligorsk miners, must pay for statutory
protection of the right to strike, however, is considerable
Moreover, effective enforcement of these statutory
indeed. 2 16

Those persons
210. Code, supra note 124, at ch. 6.9, art. 6.9.0-4.
attempting to coerce nonconforming workers are subject to criminal liability
under separate legislation. See supranote 208.
211. Code, supranote 124, at ch. 6.9, art. 6.9.0-13.
212. Id. at ch. 6.9, art. 6.9.0-17.
213. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i). This subsection provides specifically that
lawful strikers cannot encourage other workers to strike, nor can the strikers
threaten other workers with the intent of coercing them into joining the strikers'
cause. A conspicuous proviso to this noncoercion provision reinforces the legality
of primary striking and primary picketing, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B), but the
subsection makes it clear that this right to primary striking cannot infringe upon
every employee's equal right to refrain from strike activity, a right guaranteed
under § 7 of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
214. Code, supra note 124, at ch. 6.9, art. 6.9.0-5. This provision serves
the same basic function, though in much less detail, as does § 8(b)(4) of the

NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4).
See supratext accompanying notes 186-202.
215.
216. Considering the severe penalties imposed on unlawful strikers and the
real potential for courts to find strikes unlawful, see supranote 208, striking even
under the Code may well be a gamble some workers are not willing to take,
especially in the face of a favorable arbitration award. Also, although employees
have less reason to fear employers, in terms of losing jobs as a result of strike
activity, they now have potentially more reason to fear the courts, should a strike

be determined unlawful.
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protections necessitates corresponding reform in the Belarussian
court system.

2 17

5. Health and Safety in the Workplace
The Code thoroughly and commendably addresses health and
safety in the workplace. Chapter 2.16, entitled "Industrial Safety"
and Chapter 2.17, "Investigation and Registration of Occupational
Accidents," devote thirty-five articles to the issue of occupational
health and safety. Under the Code, all employers are statutorily
required to "provide healthy and safe working conditions and to
introduce facilities and technologies in order to comply with
sanitary
standards
and
industrial
safety
standard
requirements." 2 18 The articles under Chapter 2.16 deal with such
topics as employer and employee responsibilities regarding
industrial safety regulations, 21 9 protective clothing, 2 20 periodic
worker breaks during working hours,2 2 1 medical examinations, 2 22
transfers to less arduous work, 22 3 and transportation to medical
facilities of workers taken ill on the job.2 2 4 Finally, Article 20 of
the chapter imposes material liability upon employers for
damages incurred by workers as a result of job-related injury or
22 S
health impairment.
Chapter 2.17 addresses the investigation and registration of
occupational
accidents and creates
special investigative
commissions for serious and fatal work-related accidents. 2 2 6 This
chapter must be read in tandem with Chapter 7.6, which creates
a public labor inspectorate 2 27 similar to the body of social

217. Undeniably, the Code improves upon the previous state of affairs with
regard to strikes. Now, however, judicial reform must accompany the statutory
labor reform, since almost all labor disputes culminating in strikes will be
adjudicated before the courts of law, not before the labor dispute commission.
Granted, the courts will have the Code as a guideline for adjudication. Good
instruments, however, do not necessarily make good musicians. If employees are
to fully realize the potential that lies within the Code's protection of their rights,
corresponding court reform, which places more emphasis on equitable resolution
of employer-employee disputes, is the indispensable other half of labor reform in
Belarus.
218.
Code, supranote 124, at ch. 2.16, art. 2.16.0-1.
219.
Id. at ch. 2.16, arts. 2.16.0-5, 2.16.0-7.
220.
Id. at ch. 2.16, art. 2.16.0-11.
221.
Id. at ch. 2.16, art. 2.16.0-15.
222. Id. at ch. 2.16, art. 2.16.0-16.

223.

Id. at ch. 2.16, art. 2.16.0-17.

224.

Id. atch. 2.16, art. 2.16.0-19.

225. Id. at ch. 2.16, art. 2.16.0-20.
226. Id. at ch. 2.17, art. 2.17.0-11.
227. Id. at ch. 7.6, art. 7.6.0-1. The public labor inspectorate is, according
to the Code, "a public authority exercising control and supervision of compliance

with labour legislation, labour protection and safety regulations, and labour
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inspectors created under the Belgian Labor Inspection Act. 2 28
Chapter 7.6 outlines the basic functions and rights of the public
labor inspectors 2 2 9 and effectively creates national, regional, and
local mechanisms of inspection to ensure compliance with the
rigorous health and safety standards established in Chapters 2.16
and 2.17. Upon inspection and evaluation of a given worksite,
the decision of the public labor inspectorate is binding on all
employers, officials, and workers. 2 30 This final chapter of the
Code offers an exhaustive list of remedial steps that may be taken

by labor inspectors to enforce compliance with health and safety
standards in the workplace. 2 3 1 Similar to the Belgian Act in this
sense, the Code exhibits its potential to effectively ensure safe,
healthy working conditions in Belarus.

While the structure of the public labor inspectorate under the
Code resembles that of the social inspectors under the Belgian
Act, certain dissimilarities clearly distinguish the two laws in
terms of actual inspection and enforcement. The inspectors' right
to enter the workplace at any time and commence investigations
is similar under both statutes, 23 2 but the depth of information
and materials attainable by the Belgian inspectors greatly exceeds
Clearly,
that permitted under the Belarussian Code.2 3 3
enforcement under the Belgian Act, as well as under the U.S.

safety and industrial sanitation standards and norms." Id. at ch. 7.6, art. 7.6.01(1).
Belgian Act, supra note 149, § 1.
228.
229.
Code, supranote 124, at ch. 7.6, art. 7.6.0-2, 7.6.0-3.
Id. at ch. 7.6, art. 7.6.0-1(2).
230.
The Code authorizes the labor inspectors to: (1) issue fines; (2)
231.
suspend production if continued violations would threaten workers' lives or
health; (3) demand modifications that conform to labor protection regulations and
standards; and (4) issue directions of immediate executory force to violating
employers to make appropriate improvements ensuring compliance with health
and safety standards. I&. at ch. 7.6, art. 7.6.0-7.
Compare Belgian Act, supra note 149, § 4(1) with Code, supra note
232.
124, at ch. 7.6, art. 7.6.0-71(1) (authorizing social inspectors and public labor

inspectors, respectively, to enter work places to conduct an inspection at any time
without prior notice to employers).
233. Under the Belgian Act, inspectors can question employees, check
identities of any and all employees at the worksite, demand production of books,
registers, documents, and other data sources charting compliance (or lack
thereof) with health and safety standards legislation, take samples of all
processed and finished goods for close inspection, take possession of inspected
goods, order documents to be displayed, and retain these documents as proof of
compliance or noncompliance with the health and safety standards. Belgian Act,
supra note 149, § 4(2)(a)-(g). By contrast, the Code merely authorizes inspectors
to "request and obtain from managers and other workers statements and
documents which are relevant to the subject of inspection." Code, supra note
124, at ch. 7.6, art. 7.6.0-7(2).
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4
counterpart, the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970,23
is more comprehensive and more effective than under the Code.
Furthermore, the fines permitted in the event of violations of
industrial health and safety standards in Belarus are relatively
negligible 23 s when compared with the civil and criminal penalties
imposed under the Belgian Act. 23 6 Thus, the motivation for
employers to strictly abide by industrial health and safety
legislation is not as strong under the present draft of the Code as
it might be under a more stringent, Belgian-style Code. On the
whole, then, enforcement of health and safety standards under
the Code is commendable as compared to pre-Code conditions,
but relatively ineffective when compared to the provisions of the
23 7
exemplary Belgian Labor Inspection Act.

6. Social Insurance
I One key issue around which the Soligorsk miners rallied was
the protection and enhancement of social insurance.
Unfortunately, the Code does not go very far in achieving this
goal. Only one of the 639 articles in the Code addresses the topic
of social insurance, and sparingly at that:
"Public social
insurance of workers shall be implemented in accordance with
legislation." 23 8 This provision can mean only one thing: workers
will be treated no differently than any other citizen with respect to
the benefits provided by social insurance. Thus, the Code adds
nothing to the status of social insurance for laborers in Belarus,
unless new legislation is pending on the subject. 23 9
More
importantly, the Code fails even to protect employee benefits
through social insurance, a function served well by the Belgian
Act. 2 40 Since social assistance is principally disbursed through

234.

235.

29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78.
Belarussian labor inspectors can fine employers who violate labor and

industrial safety legislation only up to 50 minimum wages, a standard that, once
again, is not defined in the Code but that we can assume is rather low. Code,
supranote 124, at ch. 7.6, art. 7.60-7(5).
236. Belgian social inspectors can fine violating employers up to 200,000
francs. Belgian Act, supranote 149, § 17.
237. See generally CEELI, supranote 7, at 14.
238. Code, supranote 124, at ch. 5.1, art. 5.1.0-1.
239. As of the time of printing, no such legislation was pending before the
Supreme Council.
240. By entrusting the social inspectors with enforcement of legislation
concerning social security and social assistance, the Belgian Act ensures that
employers will carefully tend to the needs of workers receiving aid under social
insurance. Belgian Act, supranote 149, § 1.
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the employer, 2 4 1 the lack of social insurance legislation leaves
workers no better off now than before the Code was drafted.
The Code also makes no mention of workers' compensation,
which is surprising for such a comprehensive and detailed piece
of legislation. To their credit, the drafters devoted several articles
to specific compensation schemes regarding hours of work in
general, overtime, vacation days, and holidays. 2 42 In addition,
many articles are dedicated to workers' labor and social leaves
and compensation details enforceable thereunder. 24 3 Finally, the
Code does provide for unemployment benefits, but with several
noteworthy limitations. 2 " Even with these extensive provisions
governing wage compensation, leave time, and unemployment
benefits, the Code suffers greatly from its gaping lack of guidance
on both workers' compensation and social insurance.
7. Job Training and Retraining
The Code treats the subject of retraining in two different
contexts:
(1) skill improvement and retraining of current
employees and (2) vocational training, skill improvement, and
retraining of unemployed persons.
Chapter 2.14, which
addresses the former, provides that employers shall bear the cost
of improving the skills of and retraining their employees at least
once a year.2 4
Special training facilities will house the
2
improvement and retraining activities on a full-time basis, 46
although it is unclear from the Code exactly who will run these
facilities and how long the periods of improvement and retraining
will last. Proper documentation of successful retraining is also
2 47
mandated.
The multiple positive effects of this retraining requirement
are readily apparent. For example, continued employment is
more efficient since employees are constantly keeping up with the
latest technology and methods. Also, released employees are

241.
See generallyZAPRUDNIK, supra note 8,at 115 (stating that the Belarus
government neglected the social needs of its workers when attempting to achieve
economic growth).
242.
See generallyCode, supranote 124, at ch. 2,10 ("Working Time").
243.
See generally id. atich. 2.12 ("Labour and Social Leaves").
244. Id. at ch. 4.6. This chapter outlines how unemployment benefits are
granted through the public employment service and also discusses denial of
unemployment benefits, at Article 4.6.0-2, restrictions on the level of
unemployment benefits, at Article 4.6.0-3, and the period of unemployment
benefits payments, at Article 4.6.0-4.
245.
Id. at ch. 2.14, art. 2.14.0-1(1) to (3).
246.
Id. at ch. 2.14, art. 2.14.0-1(4).
247.
Id. at ch. 2.14, art. 2.14.0-1(5).
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more attractive to potential employers as a result of their
continued retraining and consistent skill improvements. On the
negative side, the retraining requirement may impose a financial
strain on employers due to the annual funding of the skill
improvement activities. The resulting increased efficiency of their
workforces, however, will likely offset this additional business
expenditure.
Employees who have been terminated and have since joined
the ranks of the unemployed are not simply forgotten. The Code
establishes procedures by which unemployed persons can receive
vocational training (or retraining) and skill improvement as
well. 2 48 Such training and improvement of existing skills will be
carried out at the same training centers established under
Chapter 2.14, and funding for this retraining will come from a
"[plublic employment promotion fund." 2 49 While the Code does
not reveal the source of this funding, it does require some
contribution from the employer who released the unemployed
worker.2 s
Furthermore, the Code authorizes grants for
unemployed persons to support dependents during periods of

retraining and skill improvement. 25 1 These efforts at establishing

and maintaining job training and retraining are commendable,
and perhaps such legislative attempts to bolster the labor market
will gain the attention of lawmakers in the United States.25 2 In
any event, the Code's treatment of this issue is more than
adequate in light of the potential unemployment problems facing
Belarus as its new market economy develops. 25 3

IV. CONCLUSION
The Draft Labor Code pending approval in Belarus is indeed

an enthusiastic, ambitious attempt at regulating the employment
relationship in the new Republic. Despite a lack of clearly defined

248.
Id. at ch. 4.7, art. 4.7.0-1.
249.
Id. at ch. 4.7, art. 4.7.0-1(2).
250.
Id. at ch. 4.7, art. 4.7.0-1. Article 4.7.0-1(3) and (4) appear to place
some financial responsibility for the skill improvement and retraining of
unemployed persons on the employer who fired or laid off the worker. The use of
the phrase "made redundant" is unclear but assumed to mean rendered
unemployed.
251.
Id. at ch. 4.7, art. 4.7.0-2.
252.
Former New York Governor Mario Cuomo, in a recent speech at
Vanderbilt University, called for programs in skills training and an establishment

of training vouchers to enable those presently unemployed to become more
employable. Mario Cuomo, Address at Vanderbilt University (Feb. 14, 1995). The
Belarussian Code goes a long way toward achieving this goal.
253.
See supratext accompanying note 61.

1995

DRAFT LABOR CODE FOR MINSK

899

terms, the Code is organized in an orderly and easily
understandable fashion. Dense as it is with over 600 articles
covering 262 pages, in places the Code may seem too general in
its language and regulation. Broad, sweeping rules in the areas of
collective bargaining and health and safety in the workplace are
contrasted, however, with the sparse attention given to such
seemingly important topics as workers' social insurance and
actual enforcement provisions. The Code does not suffer from a
lack of detail by any means, as is illustrated by the articles

governing employees' right to strike. Quite broad in scope and yet
very detailed in content, the Code attempts to achieve a balanced
the
and
relations
of labor-management
administration
advancement of labor stability in Belarus.
An important consideration with respect to labor stability is
the effect that the proposed Code will have on foreign capital
investment in Belarus. As the country's privatization laws entice
more foreign entrepreneurs, will the Code and its numerous
requirements have a chilling effect on private business investment
Some commentators would answer in the
and development?
affirmative, 25 4 but the very requirements imposed on the
further
employment relationship may in fact serve as a
enticement to foreign business enterprises seeking to invest in
A stable, well-organized labor force provides a
Belarus.
hospitable, if not ideal, climate for significant industrialization
and investment without serious concern for labor apathy or
The prospective foreign employers may view the
unrest.
numerous requirements under the Code as a price worth paying
for the resulting increased efficiency in their respective
workplaces.
The Code is not the end of labor relations law in Belarus, but
An early draft, it undoubtedly needs
only the beginning.
significant fine-tuning and polishing. However, its codification of
employee rights and detailed focus on the collective bargaining
process are promising signs that the new Belarussian government
is serious about labor reform in the context of a developing
What it lacks in terms of internal
capitalist economy.2 5 5

definition and enforcement capacity, the Code makes up for in its
exhausting efforts to create a body of law that can adequately
provide guidance for all aspects of the employment relationship.
Once the Code is adopted, Belarus should create a specialized
government agency existing solely to enforce this new body of law..

254.

See generally CEELI, supranote 7, at 15.

See supra text accompanying notes 140-43 (explaining the importance
255.
of the collective bargaining process in the capitalist economy).
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Legislators must immediately focus their attention on further
refining the Code language itself and creating more concrete and
more effective methods of enforcing the many new rights
guaranteed to both employers and employees under this historic
document.
Lucas G. Pagtia*
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